God -- Or Some Lesser Designer?

In Chapter V, Philo devises several arguments that accept that the universe has a designer, but deny that that designer is God. Given our traditional definition that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, is Philo correct? Or is there a response to his arguments? Does it matter if the designer is the traditional God?

Evidence and Theism

In response to Demea and Philo's attack on reason in Part I, Cleanthes proposes a principle that he thinks should be applied to any belief, including belief in God's existence.  He proposes that believers "proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs" (9).  In other words, we are justified in believing something if and only if we have evidence  -- and the degree of our belief should be calibrated to the strength of the evidence.  Is that true in every case?  What about regarding our belief in God?  Pascal, for example, proposed in his famous wager argument that, assuming there is no strong evidence either way,  it is in our best interest to believe in God.  Given the importance of accepting or rejecting theism for one's life values, is it ever permissible to believe (or disbelieve) in God on flimsy evidence?

Macbeth's Dagger and Other Illusions

Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?

What You See Is What You Get

Berkeley argues that skepticism is only possible if there is a distinction between appearance and reality.  Furthermore, he claims that that distinction collapses once we deny the existence of material substance.  Given these two premises, he concludes that skepticism in false.  But is he correct?  Does the distinction between appearance and reality collapse if idealism is true?  Is it possible for God to perceive an object differently than me?  Does that possibility redrawn the line between appearance and reality? Are there other problems with this argument?

Who Needs God?

Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?

Much Ado About a Mite

Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?

If a Tree Falls in the Woods. . .

If a trees falls in the woods and there is nobody around to hear it, does it make a sound?  Discuss.  You might want to define what you mean by a "sound," by "nobody," and perhaps even a "tree."

A Noble Failure?

Many of us in class found Descartes' foundational project to fail. Let's assume that he cannot justify all his claims to knowledge by an appeal to the Cogito. What can we learn from this failure? Should we look for a wider class of foundational beliefs? Should we avoid appeals to a God who is not a deceiver? Should we find a different way to justify beliefs that does not require an appeal to foundational beliefs?

A God Chasing His Tail?

Antoine Arnauld (among others) famously accuses Descartes of arguing in a circle: the principle of clear and distinct ideas requires a non-deceiving God to validate it, but the proof of a non-deceiving God requires the principle of clear and distinct ideas. Is Arnauld correct? If not, why not? If not, at what cost?