Tuesday, October 13, 2015
Much Ado About a Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
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Berkeley's argument is that size is a relative term. He articulates that when a human is looking at a mite's foot it is microscopic. However, when a paramecium, or another smaller microorganism is looking at the mite's foot it is humongous. Size is something that can have contradicting qualities depending on what the size of an object is compared against. Something that has contradicting qualities can't exist in the physical world, therefore size must exist in the mind. I believe this argument is successful in proving relative size as something that exists in the mind, however it doesn't prove how much space an object takes as something that exists in the mind. Ideas such as this chair takes 5 feet of space aren't something that exists in the mind, but are a universal reference point. They are facts because they aren't being compared to any other objects so the object will always take 5 feet of space whether it is seen by a human, mite, or a paramecium. Some may argue that this is not true and the object is being compared to the unit of a foot, however it is not being compared to that of a foot. The idea here is that everyone will see it as a foot, not as a relative size term. This means it wouldn't have contradicting qualities because it there would be no different perception dependent on the relative size of the perceiver. The result of this is that size that is referenced to by units does exist in the physical world, however relative size exists solely in the mind. To conquer other forms primary qualities, one must isolate the relative terms from the non-relative terms. This means to eliminate all forms of comparing objects. That is the only true way to free ourselves from primary qualities.
ReplyDeleteIdealism is the belief that there is no material world and everything we perceive is in our mind. All of our senses are just a reflection of our mind and the exterior world is nonexistent. A mite’s foot is one of the many examples that Berkley uses to prove idealism to be true. A mite is an insect that we as humans perceive as small and insignificant. However, if a mite were to see its own foot than it would perceive itself as a normal sized being. Its view of itself will be quite different from the view of a human who probably cannot see the mite’s foot because it is so small. Lastly, an even smaller insect or being will view the mite’s foot as large. Berkley argues that a mite’s food cannot be large, normal, and small all in the same object. Therefore he has proven that everything we distinctly perceive is just in our mind, meaning that idealism is true. I believe this argument is successful because it is true that an object cannot have various sizes, it has to be one consistent physical quality. One could measure the size of a mite’s foot, but a measurement does not justify how each a human, a mite, and a smaller being will perceive the mite’s foot. I think size and all physical appearances are just in our mind. A mite cannot have contradicting measurements therefore its size is only mental. The mite’s foot is just one of several successful arguments Berkley discusses in order to support idealism
ReplyDeleteBerkeley argues that matter does not exist by trying to prove the relativity of qualities of an object, such as smell, temperature, and, as in this example, size. By using the example of a mite and its foot, Berkeley attempts to disprove that size is innate, and that it is a relative quality dependent upon the sensory perception of its beholder. Berkeley's argument is that a mite's foot to a human is microscopic, yet to a being more miniscule than a mite, it appears to be quite large. This shows that size is relative to perception rather than to physicality, since an object in itself cannot be of contradicting qualities: in this case, a mite's foot cannot be both large and small. Thusly, size cannot exist in the material world; rather it must exist merely in the mind. Berkeley's argument, in my opinion, is quite sound. It follows a logical order, and is very strong given Berkeley's view. Though I have not thoroughly been convinced that matter does not exist, this argument opens up the possibility that everything we perceive may only be true by our own perceptions. There is a quality to Berkeley's argument that fares well with me: it accounts for the disparity between our perceptions and reality. Though I don’t agree that these qualities completely do not exist in the physical world, there obviously is a perceived quality about matter which abstracts matter from being entirely real, real in that it can exist without being perceived. Esse est percipi; reality depends, at least a little bit, on our perceptions, however I believe that reality exists without us in a different unperceived form. There are these certain qualities which I would say do exist in the real world, but are further derived from the mind: size exists, and can be measured, but the relativity of size adds another dimension to reality which is dependent upon the mind. Overall, I believe Berkeley is correct in his allegory of the mite; however I also believe that the conclusions he draws are far too extreme.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley makes an argument for size not actually existing by comparing the size of a mite's foot to the size of other organisms. A human will see the mite's foot as being very small, while an organism even smaller than the mite will see the mite's foot as being very large. According to Berkeley, something that exists in the physical world cannot both be small and large at the same time in the same context. Therefore, size can exist only in the mind. This argument does not hold up because the words "big" and "small" are relative terms. Anything can seem either small or large compared to another object when the actual object itself is neither small or large. Size is not whether something is small or large but rather the physical measurements of an object. No matter what system of measurement you use the object can only ever have one measurement. If the objects physical measurements changed, then you would have a lot more persuasive argument for size only existing within the mind. Size can be considered a primary quality because if we know the size we can know something for a fact about the object. The ideas of small and large are not primary qualities because we cannot actually gain any knowledge by simply knowing that an object is small or large. The same idea applies for all other primary qualities because they exist on their own and give us true knowledge rather than just a sensation or idea.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley makes an argument for size not actually existing by comparing the size of a mite's foot to the size of other organisms. A human will see the mite's foot as being very small, while an organism even smaller than the mite will see the mite's foot as being very large. According to Berkeley, something that exists in the physical world cannot both be small and large at the same time in the same context. Therefore, size can exist only in the mind. This argument does not hold up because the words "big" and "small" are relative terms. Anything can seem either small or large compared to another object when the actual object itself is neither small or large. Size is not whether something is small or large but rather the physical measurements of an object. No matter what system of measurement you use the object can only ever have one measurement. If the objects physical measurements changed, then you would have a lot more persuasive argument for size only existing within the mind. Size can be considered a primary quality because if we know the size we can know something for a fact about the object. The ideas of small and large are not primary qualities because we cannot actually gain any knowledge by simply knowing that an object is small or large. The same idea applies for all other primary qualities because they exist on their own and give us true knowledge rather than just a sensation or idea.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley's argument for idealism based on perspective between human beings and other creatures such as mites seems to stem from a basis of common sense. A mite views its own foot relative to other bodies; while to the human eye, the mites foot is barely visible. Yet there are creatures even smaller than mites, such as paramecium, that would view the foot of the mite as enormous compared to themselves. And it is impossible for the dimensions of a mites foot to be more than one exact form, so therefore, size is not a quantifiable value but instead a secondary quality which only exists in the mind of the perceiver. So idealism seems to be true, that everything we see and feel exists, but not in the physical world, but in the mind. However, there is a problem with the argument. Since there are an infinite amount of perspectives in the universe, this would mean nothing has a quantifiable value of size, but in fact, size is a measure which is able to be held to a certain value. Size itself is not the measurement of whether something is supposed to be big or small, it is just supposed to provide proper dimensions for reference. Whether something is big or small is in the mind of the perceiver, but that is extrapolated on a case-to-case basis per person and how they interpret size. So primary qualities exist on their own independent of the mind, while secondary qualities are the ones that are purely in the mind.
ReplyDeleteThrough the example of the relative size argument, Berkeley attempts to prove the dominance of idealism over realism. Berkeley’s example is that of a mite seen from two perspectives, a human and a microorganism. Berkeley perceives as how the human would observe the mite to be tiny but the microorganism would argue that it is massive. Berkeley previously argued how one object cannot have to contradicting qualities. Berkeley then notices how the mite cannot both be huge and miniscule thus the mite is merely a figment of the mind. Berkeley then further applied this example to all qualities of an object - smell, appearance, texture, sound, taste - can have contradicting perspectives by different people. Thus, he comes to the conclusion that all objects are solely in the eye of the perceiver and are not universal matter. Though I would argue that Berkeley’s proof of idealism is flawed. I believe Berkeley’s argument is stated through vague sophistry and that upon further analysis can be made void. I agree with Berkeley that one object cannot have two contradicting qualities, but I believe that Berkeley needs to further define what is a quality. In the example of the mite Berkeley argues that from one perspective the object is big and from another it is small. Though, with this example I would argue that from these two perspectives both people see the same object the only difference is their point of reference. It is a fundamental truth that to make a description of an object there must be some point of reference. Though, for society it seems to be the norm to compare an object to the average equivalent. For example, if you were to say “It’s a nice day today”, you are not simply stating the day is a nice one. You cannot make such a claim as in another country that day could be average and the description would be pointless. By saying “It’s a nice day today” you are stating that the day is nice compared to the majority of the days you typically experience. Thus, descriptions that are without a relative perspective are usually presumed to be comparing the the individuals average experiences. So when you return to the example of the mite you realize that from one perspective one person is arguing that the mite is small compared to themselves and another organism is stating that it is large compared to itself. Though, if they were to compare the size of the mite to the other beings size they would both agree on the relative size of the mite. Thus there is no contradiction. Furthermore, I believe that an object can only not have factual contradiction not opinionated. For instance, I believe that if two objects were identically measured on the same unit scales there would be no contradiction. But, if two objects were vaguely described as “big” or “small” without point of reference there is no contradictions as such descriptions are so vague that they are meaningless.
ReplyDeleteIf I see Socrates from afar and Descartes sees Socrates from close up, won’t we have different depictions of Socrates? I will say that Socrates appears to be small, while Descartes will say that he appears to be big. But Socrates cannot be big and small at the same time, so does he not exist, at least as a physical object? This made-up scenario is influenced by the original argument that Berkley proposed about size/extension in our world. Berkley argues that “a mite must be supposed to see his own foot as bodies of some considerable dimension… though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible (visible points)… and to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger” (24). There are three important components of this argument that should be clarified: one, a mite and its perception of its own foot (seems proportional); two, a human or any thing that is larger than the mite and its perception of the mites foot (shows up merely as a visible point); and finally, something smaller than the mite and its perception (mite’s foot seems large). Using these three components, Berkley concludes that extension is not a real, physical quality of an object, but rather a bundle of ideas/perceptions that are only in our mind. This idealistic argument has been used by Berkley to argue for things like temperature, sound, and intense heat; however, I feel like this does not succeed in arguing for extension/size. When looking at the argument in terms of perception and relativity (which is what this argument is all about), then it makes absolute sense that extension does not exist as a physical quality, but rather as a perception of our mind (“esse est percipe”). However, it is possible that extension does exist as a physical quality in an object using the metric system, thereby making Berkley’s argument unsuccessful. The metric system is a decimal system of units used to categorize objects by length and mass. We use the metric system to give objects a size – large and small are independent of the metric system. For example, if I measure my Berkley book to be about 4.5 inches, then my Berkley book is 4.5 inches. There is nothing I can do to deny the fact that my Berkley book has a set size. From there, I can determine whether or not it is large or small, and that is where Berkley is in fact correct. Someone carrying the Webster’s Dictionary will say that my Berkley book is teeny-weenie, while someone carrying a copy of Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit” text will say that my Berkley book is pretty big. In the end, however, both will agree that my Berkley book is 4.5 inches. So in that case, Berkley is both right and wrong. He is right in saying that extension (in a relative sense) is a part of the mind; however, his argument falls short in the fact that extension (relativity aside) does have an intrinsic property in material objects. Extension/size can be looked at in two ways, and in this case Berkley chooses to look at extension/size in terms of relativity. But objects cannot be denied of their intrinsic measurements. Therefore while I may perceive Socrates to be small and Descartes perceives him to be big, we will both agree that he is, say, 6 feet tall.
ReplyDeleteThe mite argument that Berkeley presents is that due to the difference in the way the size of the mites foot is perceived, size is a secondary quality that exists in the mind. A human looking at a mite’s foot would see it as extremely little. Due to the difference in the size of the mite and the human the mite is perceived as small. To a being that is much smaller than a mite, the mite’s foot is huge. In comparison to the smaller being the might and its foot is very big. Yet, it is not possible that something can be small and huge at the same time. According to logic one thing can’t have contradicting qualities. Thus, size exists only in the mind. The argument is successful because one thing cannot have two different qualities. If something is hard it can’t also be soft. If something is hot it can’t also be cold. If something is big it can’t also be small. These qualities are products of the mind. Something is big or small depending on how one perceives it. To one person something could seem big but another person could perceive it as small. Perception is different for different minds. Since perception is different for every mind certain characteristics can only exist in the mind. Certain characteristics can only be decided by the person who perceives. These characteristics can be different for every person because every mind is different .
ReplyDeleteAfter proving many of our senses only exist in the mind or as secondary qualities, Berkeley tries to also prove that size belongs in that category. He uses the example of a mite and its relation to human beings in order to assert that size is relative, therefore a secondary quality. The argument goes as follows. First, he says that to a mite a human’s foot is large but to a human a mite is small. Secondly, one and the same thing cannot be big and small at the same time in the physical world. Therefore, Berkeley concludes that size is relative to one’s mind and only exists in the mind. Although this argument seems to be correct, in reality humans have created measurement systems that are fixed and not relative. Therefore, size exists in the physical world. Comparing size is simple, that is why measurement systems exist. Put simply, the conclusions Berkeley assumes from his argument are far too extreme. His argument is not successful.
ReplyDeleteIn order to resist believing that primary qualities are only those that exist in the mind, one has to recognize that humans are the ones perceiving these qualities. Therefore, to a person that quality is reality and essential to whatever they are perceiving. As such, everything has a couple of essential qualities that cannot be doubted proving that they are primary qualities, not ones that we perceive to be a certain way only sometimes. In addition, there are systems that humans have created that assume the primary qualities of certain objects. Take for example color. People use the wave lengths of objects in order to assume a color to that object, making it a primary quality that exists in the physical world, not just in our minds. Thus, in terms of Berkeley’s analysis of primary qualities vs. secondary qualities, while his analysis may be compelling, the conclusions he draws are far-fetched.
In the second dialogue of George Berkeley’s Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley argues that many things that we observe in the physical world does not actually exist in the physical world. He claims that color, smells, temperature, and tastes do not exist in the physical world because they can contradict themselves and are subjective to the observer. Berkeley also goes further and argues that size does not exist in the physical world but rather in the mind. To reach this conclusion, Berkeley states that a mite’s foot will seem small to a human, normal sized to a mite, and huge to a smaller creature. An object cannot have contradicting qualities and therefore since the size of an object is subjective and relative to the observer, size cannot exist in the physical world. It would have to exist in the mind. I am convinced by Berkeley’s argument. However, I believe that his argument is missing something. As it is right now, Berkeley’s argument makes sense. A mite’s foot will be small to a human, normal size to a mite, and big to a smaller organism. However, I believe that Berkeley developed his argument based on the object in relationship to the observer. I do not believe that that is what size is. Size is actually an object’s size relative to every other object in the universe. As humans we will see the mite’s foot as small. When we say that, we are saying that the mite’s foot is small relative to the size of the observer. The same goes for the smaller organism. To that smaller organism, the mite’s foot is big in comparison to itself. If you put a mite’s foot on a chart that listed everything in the universe by size, both statements would be true. The mite’s foot would be smaller than a human but bigger than the smaller organism.
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