Tuesday, October 20, 2015
What You See Is What You Get
Berkeley argues that skepticism is only possible if there is a distinction between appearance and reality. Furthermore, he claims that that distinction collapses once we deny the existence of material substance. Given these two premises, he concludes that skepticism in false. But is he correct? Does the distinction between appearance and reality collapse if idealism is true? Is it possible for God to perceive an object differently than me? Does that possibility redrawn the line between appearance and reality? Are there other problems with this argument?
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Berkeley argues against skepticism, using material substance which he had previously disproved the existence of in his dialogues with Hylas. Philonous states that skepticism relies on illusion, however illusion can only exist if there is a clear distinction between appearance and reality. Since Philonous has already proved that material substance does not exist, and this distinction depends on the existence of material substance, skepticism falls apart. This premise, in my opinion, is justified: If there is no material substance, then what is reality comprised of? What allows us to distinguish between illusion and reality? This also brings up a larger problem: the whole world, devoid of material substance, is simply an illusion; it is all constructed by the mind, with no basis in reality. This idealist view is extreme: the world may look different to all people, without any commonality: God may perceive differently than I, but given that Berkeley states that God is a projection of the self, just with more power, it is unlikely that this is true. Perhaps with the added power, a higher form of distinction can be made, but this is impossible to know, and has very little effect on the line between reality and illusion for the individual perceiving it. The argument Philonous makes to disprove skepticism, following his logic, seems to check out, and succeeds in putting an end to Hylas’ skeptic ways. Standing without Philonous’ logic, however, the argument completely falls apart, because it depends on denying the existence of material substance, which I am not convinced about.
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ReplyDeleteBerkeley asserts that idealism defeats skepticism, rendering it objectively false. I don’t agree with idealism, which is key in making this argument, but I appreciate the way he uses it to expose flaws in skepticism. Since idealism suggests that the physical world does not exist and everything is just a collection of ideas, it can be reasonably concluded that, not only is it inaccurate to say I know nothing, I know everything. It should be noted that idealism does make it impossible to know anything of the physical world, and in doing so, actually supports skepticism to an extent, but again, skepticism is the belief that nothing of any kind can be known, and idealism obviously stops short of aligning with this stance. As for the question of whether or not the distinction between appearance and reality collapses if idealism is true, I strongly disagree with Berkeley, and my answer is a resounding no. To believe otherwise is to believe that there can be no truth beyond the physical world. That it is impossible to be wrong regarding anything other than physical qualities and that there is no difference between perception and reality when it comes to things that exist only in the mind. This is extremely far-fetched, and ignores the role of morality, which allows us to decipher between what is right and what is wrong in a way that isn’t simply subjective or a matter of opinion. It is, in fact, possible to be wrong about more than just the color or shape on an object. Thoughts, ideas, and beliefs, even if they don’t directly relate to material substance, can stray from reality. They can be wrong. Therefore, even proving that there is no physical matter about which to be incorrect fails to guarantee knowledge.